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RECONCILIATION WITH FINITUDE: 
NARRA TlVE SELFHOOD IN KIERKEGAARD'S EITHER/OR 
Eli Simmons 
S0ren Kierkegaard's authorship is notoriously enig-
matic. Writing under a long list of pseudonyms, and speaking 
in a variety of voices that articulate competing world views and 
philosophical perspectives, Kierkegaard escapes any easy cat-
egorization (as, for instance , the "father of existentialism"). 
Wbile this authorial compl exity can serve as a stumbling block 
to some , it has led to the proliferation of a robust and interpre-
tively diverse body of scholarly conversations. One such 
scholarly conversation that has developed in the contemporary 
literature approaches Kierkegaard's authorship narratologi-
cally , engaging his texts through the lens of questions relating 
to narrative identity and self-interpretation. Scholars such as 
Joakim Garff, K. Brian Soderquist , and John J. Davenport 
each take this narratological and hermeneutical approach in 
their own distinctiv e ways . Against the background of this 
burgeoning field of Kierkegaard scholarship, I will take a nar-
rative approach to Kierkegaard's corpus in the following pa-
per , focusing primarily on Either/Or (I 843) and the theory of 
narrative selfhood developed therein. 
The papers of the pseudonymous "Judge Wilhelm " 
that compose the second part of Either/Or offer a kind of 
roadmap for the task of selfhood, the task with which Kierke-
gaard is so singularly concerned throughout his authorship. 
Especially in his second letter, which Victor Eremita - the 
pseudonymous "editor" of Either/Or-has entitled "Equilib-
rium Betwee n the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Develop-
ment of Personality," Wilhelm details the various moves one 
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must make and the various interior stages one must undergo in 
order to "win what is the main thing in life": one's self. 1 What 
then are these movements and these stages? How does Wil-
helm understand the process by which a human being is able 
to become the self that she is? 
Of course , there are many angles from which one 
might approach Kierkegaard's text to wrest from it responses 
to these questions and others like them. And indeed, as much 
recent Kierkegaard scho larship has demonstrated , it is hardly 
a simple task to pin down with precision any clear and con-
sistent philosophical po ition s in the polyphony of voices that 
speak out from the pseudonymous authorship. Kierkegaard 's 
texts - Either/Or included - are hermeneutically demanding, 
abounding with a semantic surp lus that calls for constant in-
terpr tive vigilanc .2 As Joakim Garff rightly notes, "The plu-
rality of voices , pens, positions, and lit rary jokers - which are 
also present in the mo t philosophical part of the work (the 
Fragments and Postscript nee ss itate a nev r resting atten-
tivenes on b half of th r ader. The r ad r must hav a dual 
view, which not only grasps what Ki rk gaard writes, but also 
how he write what he writes." With the hermeneutic com-
plexity of K.ierk gaard's authorsh ip in mind, this pap r does 
not pret nd to captur the full scope of what is going on in 
Wilhelm's letters. In tead, thi s ay will provide one angle 
one might take when approaching Wilhelm roadmap, an an-
gle I will argu provide rich insight into the structure of hu-
man selfhood as With Im sees it and as it appears elsewher 
1 S0ren Kierkegaard, Either /Or: A Fragm ent of life, Translated by 
Alastair Hannay, (London: Penguin Books 2004), 482. 
2 For deconstructive readings of EitheJ/Or that are attentive to the 
implications of this hermen utic complexity, see Elsebet Jegstrnp's 
The New Kierkegaard (2004, p. 14-87). 
3 Joakim Garff, "'The Esthetic is Above All My Element"', The 
New Kierkegaard (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 
69. 
152 
Eli Simmons 
throughout the authorship, despite this angle's inevitabl e her-
meneutical limitations. 
In the following paper, l will offer an account ofWil-
helm 's conception of selfhood and narrative identity as this 
conception appears in the second part of Either/Or, specifi-
cally in Wilhelm's second letter, "Eq uilibrium Between the 
Aesthetic and the Ethical." I will seek to illuminate the 
roadmap to which I gestured above, paying particularly close 
attention to the way in which Wilhelm understands the role of 
finitude and situatedness in the makeup of the human self. 
Thus, drawing upon other parts of the authorship--specifi-
cally The Sickness unto Death (1849) and The Concept of 
irony (1841 )-1 will begin by offering a brief account of one 
way in which Kierkegaard seems to think that the individual 
can fail in the task of selfhood by not being properly attuned 
to the finite and concrete elements of the self that are outside 
of the individual's control. Having introduced this existential 
"wrong tum," l will then tum to Wilhelm's letter to examine 
his account of selfhood. Ultimately, I will argue that Wil-
helm s roadmap offers a way back from this existential wrong 
tum, leading the human being into reconciliation with her 
finitude and all that it implies, equipping her to come into 
alignment with herself as the particular, concrete, finite self 
that she is. 
1.2 The Wrong Turn 
In the opening paragraph of The Sickness unto Death, 
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Anti-Climacus describes 
the human being as "a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, 
of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity." 4 ln 
other words, similar to Jean-Paul Sartre's categories of tran-
scendence and facticity (though dissimilar in important 
4 S0ren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death , Translated by 
Alastair Hannay, (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 43. 
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ways),5 a human being is not just freedom, will, or imagination 
(the infinite), but is also embodied culturally and historically 
situated, intersubjectively determined and socially embedded 
(the finite). 
In many ways, this formula serves as the background 
against which Kierkegaard thinks through selfhood through-
out his authorship. One way Kierkegaard seems to think the 
human being fails in the task of selfhood is by failing to bring 
these two dialectical poles of his existence into alignment, by 
overemphasizing the infinite part of the dialectic to the denial 
of the finite. In other words, the human being chooses to 
downplay or ignore all of the parts of himself that are outside 
of his control - his particular lived body, his unchosen na-
tional identity his concrete personal history, his familial en-
tanglements, and so on- in order to magnify his existential 
freedom to shape and determine his own identity. This rejec-
tion of actuality, the rejection of one's concrete situatedness, 
results for Kierkegaard in a profound existential discontinuity. 
The self, having rejected one side of the dialectic of existence, 
becomes lost in its imaginative power of self-interpretation, 
distanced from its concrete existential situation. In The Sick-
ness unto Death, Kierkegaard examines this phenomenon un-
der the guise of defiant despair, in The Concept of Irony , under 
the guise ofromantic irony, and in Either/Or, through the char-
acter of Aesthete A. We will look briefly at these three exam-
ples in order to establish the existential illness to which Judge 
Wilhelm provides a possible remedy. 
2.1 Defiant Despair 
Though his nosology of spiritual ailments includes a 
variety of types of despair, we are concerned here with what 
Anti-Climacus calls "defiant despair." Defiant despair is the 
kind of wrong tum just described whereby the human being, 
5 For more on the relationship betwe n Kierkegaard's and Sartre's 
ideas on transcendence and facticity, see Pattison I 997, 80-84. 
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losing sight of the actuality that puts up resistance to his exis-
tential freedom , overemphasizes his freedom to create and in-
terpret his own existence according to hi whims and desires. 
Anti-Climacus describes this kind of despair as follows: 
The self want in despair to rule over himself , or cre-
ate himself, make this self the self he wants to be, de-
tennine what he will have and what he will not have 
in his concrete self His concrete self, or his concrete-
ness, has indeed necessity and limits , is this quite def-
inite thing, with these aptitudes, predispositions, etc., 
in this concrete set of circumstances etc. But by 
means of the infinite fonn, the negative self, h wants 
first to refashion the whole thing in order to get out of 
it a self such as he wants , produced by means of the 
infinite fo1m of th negative self- and it i in this way 
he wants to b himself. 6 
Thus the self in defiant de pair rejects its concretenes and it 
finite situatedness while over mphasizing its powers of imag-
inative self-interpretation . The self wants to tell a new and 
original story about itself and wants to be able to retell thi 
story at a moment's notice with fresh details. How ver, for 
Anti- limacus such an existential orientation results ulti-
mately in a loss of existential continuity for "just when [the 
self] eems on the point of having the building finished, at a 
whim it can dissolve the whole thing into nothing." 7 As K. 
Brian Soderquist puts it such a self, whose narrative identity 
dissolves ultimately into a fiction, is haunted by the possibil-
ity of starting all over again with a new interpretation. '8 In the 
end, like a stage actor for whom after many years the bounda-
6 SUD, 99. 
7 [bid., 10 I. 
8 K. Brian Soderquist, "Authoring a Self', Kierkegaard Studies 
Yearbook (2009), 153. 
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ties between self and role have disturbingly dissolved, the des-
pairing self can no longer recognize the true from the fictional 
self-narrative. Such an individual, lacking even the semblance 
of internal continuity, becomes incomprehensible to himself, 
"an enigma" and mere mystification. 9 The despairing selfs 
given, concrete self has disappeared into its "fictional, mas-
terly project , its own way of understanding itself." 10 
2.2 The Romantic Ironist 
Jn The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard examines the 
same type of exi tential misalignment Anti-Climacus de-
scribes as defiant despair through an examination and critique 
of romantic irony. 11 In the doctoral thesis, alongside and 
through a sustained engagement with the thought of I 9th cen-
tury German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, Kierkegaard decries 
the Gennan Romanticism fashionable at the time (exemplified 
by Schlegel, Tieck, and the like) for its ironic detachment from 
concrete, historical actuality: 
As irony contrives to overcome historical actuality by 
making it hover, so irony itself has in tum become 
hovering. Its actuality is sheer possibility. In order for 
the acting individual to be able to fulfil his task in re-
alizing actuality, he must feel himself assimilated into 
a larger context, must feel the seriousness of respon-
sibility, must feel and respect every rational conse-
quence. But irony is free from all this. It knows itself 
9 EO, 47. 
10 SUD, 101. 
11 For a more nuanced analysis of these ideas as they appear in 
Kierkegaard's dissertation, see K. Brian S6derquist's The Isolated 
Self: Tnith and Untruth in S@ren Kierkegaard 's On the Concept of 
Irony (2007). 
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to be in possession of the power to begin from the be-
ginning whenever it pleases, for nothing in the past is 
binding upon it. 12 
Just as the self in defiant despair, the romantic ironi t wants to 
take full control of his own narrative identity, and thus denies 
the concrete facticity - his own historical actuality his past-
that would put up resistance to his own self-understanding. 
But in the end, the story such an ironist tells to him elf about 
him self is unbelievable, for the ironist is always conscious of 
his ability to strut all over again from the beginning at any 
point. The ties that bind the ironist to the finite are clipped, 
eliminating the limitations that actuality establishes in relation 
to self-narrative. Again as Soderquist notes , the romantics 
'deny one side of the dialectic of human existence the finite 
side that we share with everything in the natural word, while 
affi1ming our own power to transcend the finite via imagina-
tion.13 The Aesthete of Either/Or is guilty of the same, and it 
is to him that we will now tum before turning to the papers of 
his counterpart. 
2.3 Aesthete A 
Aesthete A like his philosophical kindred spirits de-
scribed above, holds at a distance from himself the actuality or 
facticity that could serve as the limiting horizons upon the in-
finitude of his existential freedom and upon his aesthetic self-
interpretation; he denies the finite and the situated in favor of 
the infinite and the imaginative. Much of A's papers are con-
cerned with the phenomenon of memory, and with the accom-
panying phenomena of remembering and forgetting, and here 
his denial of actuality rears its head. A, like the despairing self 
of Sickness unto Death, "wants in its despair to savour to the 
full the satisfaction of making itself into itself, of developing 
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itself, of being itself." 14 For this reason, he makes an art fonn 
of remembering and forgetting, whereby his factical history 
becomes an infinitely malleable fictional narrative that he can 
weave and reweave to fit his variable aesthetic disposition. For 
A, "one must.. .constantly vary oneself," 15 but A is interested 
more in varying one's own self-interpretation ("intensive" var-
iation) than in varying one's life situation ("extensive" varia-
tion), though the latter has an importance of its own . 16 On ac-
count of this aesthetic existential orientation, A hovers above 
himse.lf, becomes a spectator to his own existence, loses any 
sense of textured factical connection to the shared intersubjec-
tive lifeworld or to hi own ·given set of contingent, histoiical 
circumstances . Tn developing the art of remembering and for-
getting, A thus also develops a way of living whereby he 
avoids ever being fully entrenched in or bound to his present 
experience, for to be fully present is to draw near to the world 
that A must hold at an infinite aesthetic distance from his self: 
Being able to forget depends always on how one re-
members , but how one remembers depends in turn on 
how one experiences reality ... Every life-situation 
must possess no more importance than that one can 
forget it whenever one wants to; each single life situ-
ation should have enough importance, however, for 
one to be able at any time to remember it. .. Having 
perfected the art of forgetting and the art of remem-
bering, one is then in a position to play battledore and 
shuttlecock with the whole of existence. 17 
2.4 Existentia l Misalignment 
14 SUD, 101. 
15 EO, 239. 
16 Ibid., 233. 
17 Ibid., 234 . 
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A, the elf in defiant despair, and the romantic ironist all rep-
resent to various degrees a reoccurring Kierkegaardian theme: 
the existential chaos, incoherence , discontinuity and misa-
lignment that inevitably result from not properly attending to 
one s "giv n self, '18 to the 'larger context' into \J hich on is 
thrown and from which one cannot extract one 's self 19 to the 
actuality facticity, and the concr te reality that define one's 
situated existence as an embodi d individual and delineat rhe 
limitations upon one' powers of self-interpretation. In his dis-
sertation, Kierkegaard says of the ironist what could al o be 
said of A or the despairing self: "Beca use the ironist poetically 
produces himself as well as his environment with the greatest 
possible poetic license , becaus e he lives completely hypothet-
ically and ubjuncti ely , his lifi finally loses all continuity." -0 
Loss of internal continuity is th inevitable outcome of the ex-
istential wrong tum I have outlined above . To follow A sthete 
A in hi denial of the demands of actuality, "to not merely 
think and speak aphoristically but live aphoristically ,"2 1 is to 
lose coherence or continuity as a self, for in this way one is not 
bound to any self-interpretation outside of the stories one tells 
oneself about oneself. And th se stor ies are, in the final anal-
ysis unb lievable for the moment the story is told , the self 
'can di solve the whole thing into nothing " and start again. 22 
We have thus shed light on the exi tential wrong tum 
by which the existing individual fails in the task of selfhood 
by denying one side of the dial ctic of his existence: finitude. 
How then can one return from this existentia l wrong tum? For 
an answer to this question , we tum to the second part of Ei-
ther/Or and to Wilhelms papers. 
3.0 The Papers of B 
18 SUD, 99. 
19 CJ, 296. 
20 Ibid., 30 I. 
21 £0, 212. 
22 SUD IOI. 
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In his papers, Judge Wilhelm establishes his theory of ethical 
elfhood a theory which attributes central importance to 
choice- Sp cifically to choosing oneself. For Wilhelm, self-
hood begins in the act of ethical choice through which the in-
dividual chooses himself absolutely and thus takes responsi-
bility for very element and aspect of his existence, the chosen 
and the contingent alike. Due to the brevity of this paper, I will 
not consider all of the dimensions of Wilhelm's account of 
ethical self -choice. Jnstead, I wi ll focus here on Wilhelm's ac-
count of reconci liation, ith finitude and the existential conti-
nuity that results from this movement. Havin g ethically chosen 
oneself in one's' eterna l validity, 23 how does Wilhelm think 
th human being can become reconciled to the fini t pole of 
her exi tence? Furthermore , how doe s such a reconciliation 
bring about an interior continuity that Wilhelm believes A 
lacks? What might self- interpretation look like in the wake of 
these existential movements? 
3.1 Repentance into Finitude 
For Wilhelm, one essential element of eth ical se lf-
cho ice is the movement by which the individual takes respon-
ibility not only for what he feels he has chosen, but also for 
all of those elements of his identity that he has not chosen and 
that he can neither control nor interpret away: his particular 
' aptitudes and "passio ns,' his body and his "definite sur-
roundings. '24 The ethical individual doe not want to erase 
this concretion' that he himself is but see in it [hi ] task." 25 
Furthermore by taking responsibility for his d finit concrete-
ness, for the chosen and the unchosen for both poles of the 
dialectic of selfhood, the ethical indi idual takes hold of him-
23 EO, 516. 
24 Ibid., 542. 
25 Ibid. , 545. 
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self a "a diver ely d tennined concretion and chooses him-
self ther for in re pect of his concretion." 26 One way that 
Wilhelm de cribe uch a total and encompassing type of self-
choice is through the idea of repenlance: 
[The ethical indjvidual] repents hjmself back into 
himself back inlo the family, back into the race, until 
he finds himself in God. Only on these terms can he 
choose himself and h want no other , for only thus 
can he ab olutely choose himself. .. it is only if I 
choose myself as guilty that J choose myself abso-
lut ly, if ever my choosing myself absolutely is not to 
be identical with creating myself. 27 
Whit th re i certainly theological content to Wilhelm's con-
ception of repentance this concept need not be only under-
tood in traditional theological tenns. In tead, repentance is 
th word Wilhelm uses to describe taking hold ofoneself in all 
of one contingency and particularity , as 'a diversely deter-
min d concretion 28 and refusing to leave anything out of the 
story . Although in the end we do receive our given sel es 
from th hand of the eternal God ' according to Wilhelm's 
account 29 we start by imply choosing to be precise] who we 
are wh r we are in our messy and complex particularity. 30 
26 Ibid., 543. 
27 Ibid. 518. 
28 Ibid., 547. 
29 Ibid., 519. 
30 od rqui t notes in an analysis of The Sickness unto Death that, 
for Ki rk gaard, "o ne might say that to be grounded in God comes 
very clo to being grounded in God' gift of ituatedness" (Soder-
qui t 20 I 3, p. 7). or Wilhelm , a well a for Anti-Climacus rec-
onciling oneself to one' finitude and situatedness i inextricably 
bound up with reconciling oneself to the "power that established ' 
the elf (SUD, p. 44) the God from whom one receives oneself and 
one existential situation as a gift. Though J do not focus on this 
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Wherea A ' looks at himself in his concretion and then distin-
gui hes one thing from another' seeing "one thing as belong-
ing to him accidenta lly and another a belonging essen-
tially" 31 the ethical abolishes this distinction and takes 
responsibility for the entire given self preci sely as it is given. 
This is why for Wilhelm, one must choose oneself as "guilty," 
because otherwise it is left to the individual to interpret away 
those parts of herself or her past for which she would rather 
not take up respo nsibility. As Agnes Heller puts it, if the indi-
vidual who does not repentantly choose h rself as guilty 'at 
any time does something out of character, he can say that she 
has not cho n it. Yet if she repented back into all of her life 
contingencie she could never say that she did something be-
caus sh wa determined by this or that, because she has cho-
sen all her contingencies freely . '32 Thu s, the category of guilt 
inaugurat s the movement of repentance and dethrones the 
aesthetic or ironic individual 's select ive If-interpretation , 
calling him to take hold of himself in his entirety calling him 
to repent himself back into himself as this guilty particular, 
existing individual. 
Having chosen oneself repentantly under the category 
of guilt having chosen oneself as 'this definite individual , 
with these aptitudes these tendencie , the instincts, these 
passions, innuenced by these definite surrou ndin gs as this 
definite product of a definite outside world '33 one comes into 
alignment with the finitude that del ineate th boundaries of 
e lem nt of Wilhelm's conception ofseltl1ood h re, and while I be-
lieve we can in tructively read his papers apart from their "theo log-
ical" implication , I view these implications as e sential to a robust 
engagement with Either/ Or and with l(jerkegaard s thought as a 
whole. 
31 EO, 550. 
32 Agnes H lier, "The Papers ofB as the Mod m Answer to both 
Aristotle and Kant "Kie rkegaard Studies Yearbook (2008) 9. 
33 EO 542. 
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the stories one can tell about oneself. ln choosing himself ab-
solutely, the ethical indjvidual brings the dialectical poles of 
his existence towards alignment by freely choosing his own 
contingency, his own history, his own situatedness, and he 
thereby "assumes responsibility for it all." 34 The ethical indi-
vidual 'chooses himself as product- and this choice i free-
dom's choice ' 35 for Wilhelm s eth ical freedom does not de-
note the aesthetic freedom to produce onese lf, but the freedom 
to take up free responsibility for the produced self that one al-
ways already is. And it is precisely in this movement of rec-
onciliation to finitude that one comes into "absolute continuity 
with the reality one belongs to. '36 
3.2 Existential Continuity 
Joakim Garff writes that "In rus criticism of the A.es-
thete's life, Wilhelm highlights repeatedly that he lacks any 
continuity in his existenc which consequently remain frag-
mentary and fails to transfonn itself into a genuine story." 37 
That ethical self-choice is the ground upon wruch one can es-
tablish an existential and narratological continuity is brought 
into relief when Wilhelm writes: 
Only when one has taken possession of oneself in the 
choice, has attired oneself in ones self, has penetrated 
oneself so totally that every movement i att nded by 
the consciousness of a re ponsibility for ones If only 
then has one hosen on self ethically only then has 
one repented onese lf, only then is one concrete, only 
34 lbid., 542. 
35 Ibid., 543 
36 Ibid., 541 
37 Joakirn Garff, "A Ma ter of Mjrnesis: Kierkegaard and Rica::ur on 
arrative Identity Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook (2015), 312. 
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th n is one, in one's total iso lation in absolute conti-
nuity with the reality one belong to. 8 
Thu one's life is transformed into a "g nuine story" when one 
stops trying to make up a new story, and chooses instead to 
take respon ibility for every part of the story one has already 
lived- th story of which the self is indeed the "product." 39 
Whereas the aesthetic individual looks back upon a disordered 
past in which his elf dissolves "into a multitude, ,4o identify-
ing hims If ess ntially with this or that event but refusing to 
take respon ibility for the whole, the ethical individual pos-
sesses "a hi tory in whic h he acknowledges identity with him-
s If" and through which he acknowledges that "he is only the 
one he i , with this history.',4 1 To imaginatively interpret away 
som el m nt of this history, to pick and choose among the 
events of this history in order to wrest from it an idealized but 
incomplete self-narrative, is to do violence to the continuity 
by which the self is able to acknowledge "ident ity with him-
self.'>42 The e s ntial role of personal history in Wilhelm's ac-
count of I fhood is brought further into relief when he writes 
the following: 
For the eterna l dignity of man lies in the fact that he 
can acquire a history and the divine element in him 
lie in the fact that he himself can impart to his history 
a continuity ifhe will· for it acquires that not b being 
th um of all that has happened to or befa ll n me, but 
by being my own work so that even what ha befallen 
me is transformed in me and translated from necessity 
to freedom. 43 
38 £0, 541. 
39 Ibid. , 543. 
40 Ibid. , 479. 
41 Ibid., 518. 
42 Ibid., 518. 
43 Ibid ., 542. 
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Garff describes the idea latent in this passage this way: ' To 
acquire one's own history is the deed,' whereby one transfers 
the occurrences of one's past from necessity to 'freedom.' 
What fonnerly was the individual's histmy becomes by this 
'deed' the individual's personal narrative.' ,44 Thus, historical 
and narrative continuity is not something one attains imply 
by virtue of having a past, but is itself a product of human will; 
it is a product of the free choice by which the indi idual re-
pentantly chooses onese.lf in one's absolute particularity. This 
is why Garff notes furt her that 'Human being is thus always 
defined by its history, but never utterly determin ed by it.',45 
Reconciling ones If to one's finitude and thereby coming into 
continuity with one's concrete reality does not mean that one 
is simply fre from the work of self-interpretation but it does 
mean that self-interpretation cannot be identical with self-cre-
ation. To move the dialectical poles ofone's existence towards 
alignment is not to magnify the finite to the detriment of the 
infinite for this too is a kind of despair - the despair of lacking 
infinitude. 46 As Anti-Climacus notes "to become ometh ing 
concrete is neither to become finite nor to become infinite for 
that, hich is to become concrete is indeed a synthesis. "'7 Thus 
in the synthesizing movement of ethjcal self-choice freedom 
remains, and s If-interpretation with it, but ethical self-inter -
pretation possesses responsibilities to its given actuality that 
aesthetic self-interpretation rejects. 
3.3 Editoria l Respoos ibiUty 
Having chosen oneself as a "diversely determined 
concretion ,"48 having repented oneself back into oneself in all 
44 Garff2015, 312. 
45 Ibid., 313. 
46 SUD 63-65. 
47 lbid. 59. 
4 £0, 543. 
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of one's finitude and contingency; having thereby come into 
alignment with actuality and established a free continuity with 
one's determinate history, Wilhelm is cognizant of the fact that 
the work of self-interpretation must go on . To recognize and 
take hold of one's finitude is not to abolish the narratological 
self-interpretation inextricably bound up with human reflexiv-
ity and self-consciousness (the infinite pole), but is to establish 
its limitations. The limitations within which self-interpretation 
thus takes place are the limitations of the given, factical con-
text and the determinate history into which the self is always 
already thrown as the finite self that it is. Thus, for Wilhelm, 
the distinction between the accidental and the essential ele-
ments of one's given self 
is not the product of whim, making it look as though 
[the ethical individual] had absolute power to make 
himself into whatever he wanted. For although the 
ethical individual might refer to himself as his own 
editor, he is at the same time fully aware of his edito-
rial responsibility to himself, in so far as what he 
chooses has a decisive influence on him personally, to 
the scheme of things in which he lives, and to God. 49 
The idea of "editorial responsibility" establishes the decisive 
chasm between Wilhelm's conception of selfhood and that of 
defiant despair, the ironist, and the aesthete. For, as Garff puts 
it, "Being an editor is to intervene in an already existing 
text .' 50 The self is then not its own creator, but the responsible 
editor of the concrete, given self that it is . A or the ironist 
would like "to begin a little earlier than other people, not at 
and with the beginning, but 'in the beginning,'" thus creating 
themselves as if they could get outside of life, as if they could 
step outside of themselves and mould themselves from a God-
49 Ibid., 551. 
50 Garff 2015, 314. 
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like vantage point. 51 Wilhelm, on the other hand, starts with 
the self as finite, as continuous with a particular history, as 
determined by a multitude of factors he cannot control, as 
thrown into a context he cannot escape, as "an individual who 
has these abilities these passions, the e inclinations , these 
habits subject to th s external influences, and who is influ-
enced thus in one direction and thus in another. '52 And it is as 
this definite individual, as the ethical self who has chosen him-
self in all of his particularity, that the self unde1takes the on-
going and infinitely demanding task of self-interpretation, 
fully aware of his ineluctable editorial responsibility to the 
concrete reality that partially defines him. 
To borrow another authorial metaphor from Soder-
quist, the person who is sensitive to facticity r cognizes that 
he is not his own creator; he must indeed as ist in telling a 
story about the self, but his role is that of a 'co-author' so to 
speak." 53 The elf is not its sole author but writes within and 
alongside a text much of the contents of which are fixed by 
forces outside of the co-author's control, but which the self 
nonetheless freely embraces and accepts, thus translating "ne-
cessity to freedom" and taking up responsibility even for what 
the self qua co-author did not choo e to write. 54 
4.0 Conclus ion 
In conclusion, Wilhelm provides in his papers one 
way to make sense of selfhood against the backgrow1d of the 
existential misalignment that reappears at every stage of Kier-
kegaard's authorship. The way towards this misalignment is 
the rejection of the finite· the way back is the reconciliation 
with that which ha been rejected. However it is important to 
51 SUD, 99. 
52 EO, 552. 
53 Soderquist 2009, 158. 
54 EO, 542. 
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note that in lived experience , these stages are not always dis-
crete and chronologically isolated. Indeed, the structure of Ei-
ther/Or itself gestures to the possibility that the human subject 
is probably always caught up somewhe re between these two 
dia lectical stages, moving now in one direction and now in the 
other. And if Victor Eremita i right that the papers of A and 
B are 'the work of one man" who has "lived through both 
kinds of experience" or has "d liberated on both," 55 then these 
two existential movements tell the story of a single human self, 
and they thu hav both existed or coexist within that self. Re-
jection of actuality is the condition of the reconci liation which 
B outlines, but this latter movement cannot be dogmatically 
secured against the former. Reconciliation with finitude re-
mains vulnerable, porously open to the possibility of rejection, 
and Wilhelm's confident voice remains haunted by A's Di-
apsalmata that one could write like marginal notes along the 
edges of B s most triumphant turns of phrase. And perhaps, 
hidden fi-om the reader 's iew th y are implicitly and invisi-
bly scribbled there, whether cribbled by A or B it doesn't 
much matter. After all, they are probably one and the same. 
55 Ibid. , 36. 
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